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1.

ARGUMENT
THE SENTENCING HEARING ON MAY 23, 1995, WAS A CRITICAL
STAGE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING DURING WHICH
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

In its Brief, the State argues that because Defendant was not
"sentenced" at the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the hearing did
not constitute a "critical stage" in the criminal proceeding.

In the

process, the State acknowledges that, "arguably, it would have been
easy and preferable for the court to continue the

[May 23, 1995]

hearing simply to have conflict counsel present . . . ." (Brief of
Appellee, pp. 10 and 12).
As a matter of well-settled law, "[s]entencing is a critical
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to
the effective assistance of counsel."

State

1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (citing Mempa v.

Rhay,

254 (1967); Specht
and

Townsend

v.

Patterson,

Burke,

v.

v. Caserez,

656 P. 2d

389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct.

386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967);

334

U.S.

756,

68

S.Ct.

1252

(1948)).

Procedural fairness is an obligatory at the sentencing phase of a
Id.

trial as at the guilt phase."

(citing Presnell

U.S. 14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 236

(1978)).

v.

Georgia,

439

Further, the right to

assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and may be waived by a
competent

accused

intelligently'
1987); see

made."
also

[only]

State

Argersinger

if

v.
v.

the

waiver

Frampton,
Hamlin,
4

is

^knowingly

and

737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah
407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct.

2006, 2012 (1972); Johnson
1019, 1023 (1938); State
State v.

Wilson,

v.
v.

Zerbst,

Ruple,

304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S. Ct.
631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981);

563 P.2d 792, 793-94

intelligent waiver is required because

(Utah 1977).
xx

A knowing and

[w] hen an accused manages

[her] own defense, [s]he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter,
many

of

the

traditional

Faretta

counsel."

2541 (1975).
to counsel
Gutierrez,

benefits

v. California,

with

the

to

422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525,

cannot

be

considered

harmless

See State

error.

864 P.2d 894, 898 n.4 (Utah App. 1993); State
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied,

(Utah 1991), cert, denied,
v.

right

Furthermore, the violation of the constitutional right

808 P.2d 1100, 1109

McKaskle

associated

Wiggins,

U.S.

v.

v.

Sampson,

817 P.2d 327

, 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992);

Cf.

465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n.8

(1984) ("Since the right of self-representation is a right that when
exercised

usually

increases

the

likelihood

of

a

trial

outcome

unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to "harmless
error" analysis.

The right

is either respected or denied;

its

deprivation cannot be harmless").
That the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing was a critical stage
in the criminal proceeding against Defendant is evidenced not only by
the fact that the hearing was part and parcel of the sentencing
proceedings, as a whole, but by the trial court's own terminology

5

utilized

during

the May 23, 1995, Sentencing

subsequent Order for 60 Day Evaluation.

Hearing

and the

After granting the oral

motion of Defendant's appointed counsel to withdraw as counsel at the
May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the following exchange between the
trial court and Defendant took place:
THE COURT: Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for
sentencing.
The recommendation is
that you be
sentenced to the Utah State Prison five years to
life.
I believe that I do need more information and what I'm
proposing is sentence [sic] you to the Department of
Corrections
for a 60-day evaluation.
In the
evaluation they determine your background and make a
recommendation if you should -- if I should follow the
recommendation or that you should be in some
alternative program.
MS. MARTINEZ
today?
THE COURT:

[DEFENDANT]:

Do I have to go to jail

Uh-huh.

MS. MARTINEZ: You can't give me a couple of days to
get things straightened out with my children, get
things put away?
THE COURT: No, and the circumstances I'm concerned
about, whether you'd be there --.
MS. MARTINEZ: I also have --my mother is also dying.
They don't give her very much time to live. I'll be
back. I'll do my time. I know I did a crime.
THE COURT: Well, I'm really concerned about potential
risk of not being there, given the circumstances and
therefore, I'm going to order you --.
MR. CAMPAS:

Your Honor --

THE COURT:

State you name.
6

MR. CAMPAS: Edward Campas. I'm her brother. And
your Honor, I'm the one who told her to file the
grievance against Mr. Albright because he has been
prejudiced against this.
He has asked -- she has
asked him not to represent her.
MR. ALBRIGHT:
Then she
represent her. I object to
that's not been filed with
The court has nothing to do

went ahead and had me
him bringing anything up
the court at this time.
with that.

THE COURT:
If you want to address
sentencing,
that's the issue.
MR. CAMPAS:

the issue

of

I will guarantee she'll come back.

THE COURT: Well, if she comes back you are going to
have I think circumstances. . . .
(R. 46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing) (Emphasis
Added).

That same day, the trial court signed an Order for the 60

Day Evaluation, which states in relevant part:
This
matter
came before
the
Court
for
pronouncement
of sentence
on May 23,
1995.
Plaintiff appeared by through Carvel R. Harward,
county Attorney for Davis County.
Defendant
appeared in person and by his attorney,
Don Redd
[sic]. . . -1
There being no legal
reason presented
to
the Court why judgment should not be
pronounced,
and it appearing
to the Court that
imprisonment
may be appropriate
in
this
case,
but more
x

The confusion surrounding the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing
is further evidenced by the trial court's statement in the Order that
Defendant appeared at the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing "by his
[sic] attorney, Don Redd [sic]" when Defendant, contrary to the
court's Order, actually appeared pro se after the trial court granted
her appointed counsel's oral motion to withdraw as counsel (see R.
46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing).
7

detailed information is desirable as a basis for
determining the final
sentence,
than has been
provided by a presentence r e p o r t . . . .
(R. 22, Order for 60 Day Evaluation) (Emphasis Added).
At page 10 of its Brief, the State argues that " [i]f the May
[sentencing] hearing at issue here had involved the pronouncement and
imposition of defendant's sentence, this Court would be faced with a
"l cri tical

stage

at wiii ch tl le absence

of coin isel

generally

constitute error not subject to a harmlessness analysis."

would

Such an

assertion is not supported by direct authority, rather it is contrary
* *1 e s S n • :- n, e C o i I r t c a s e 1! a w, \ J 1 i e i e , :i i I [ In i t e d S t a t e s v J
Wade,

388 U . S . 218, 87 S... Ct.

1926 (1967),

the Court

defined

a

" .::..-.::a- stage" as a stage "where the results might well settle the
accused's fate . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
1931.

J.U. at 2 2 4 , 87 S. Ct. At

The distinction of whether the sentence is actually pronounced

DI : :i i riposecii

i ip : i i tl i B defendant

c .t sentei I :::il ng |: ] : : motes

f :)i: n: i ov

substance, especially when the constitutional right to the assistance
of counsel is involved. 2
Finally, the State argues in its Brief that there was no p u r p 0 s e
served b y having counsel represent Defendant

at the May 23,

1995,

S e n t: e n c i n g He a r i n g , a i i d t h a t " t h e o n 1 y t: h i i ig • i o n e . :i I ti h a I I. .i"' " 11 e a i i n g
2

The State's characterization of the M a y 23, 1995, Sentencing
Hearing as being merely "preparatory" to sentencing is also contrary
to the previously cited United States Supreme Court case law for the
same reasons.
8

in conflict counsel's absence was the preparatory step of submitting
defendant for the 60-day diagnostic evaluation . . . ."

The State,

however, fails to recognize that at the point where the trial court,
after depriving Defendant of her right to the assistance of counsel,
expressed its inclination to commit Defendant to prison, effective
counsel

could

mitigation

of

have
the

marshaled
impending

commendations

sentence.

and

Such

arguments

commendations

in
and

arguments in mitigation of incarceration include Defendant's total
lack

of

involvement

Investigation

Report,

in
p.

the

juvenile

5),

(see

system

Defendant's

Presentence

relatively

recent

involvement in the criminal justice system, which also indicates that
Defendant does not present a danger to society

(see Presentence

Investigation Report, p. 6) , and collateral comments from sources
close to Defendant that she is a "very good mother" with a problem
centered around alcohol and drug abuse (see Presentence Investigation
Report, pp. 10-11).

The trial court's failure to allow Defendant to

be represented by counsel at the remainder of the hearing or to
obtain

a valid waiver

of

the

right

to counsel

also

prejudiced

Defendant by preventing her, as a pro se criminal litigant, from a
full and fair opportunity to challenge any discrepancies

in the

Presentence Investigation Report as she is entitled to pursuant to
See

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) .

9

Kuehnert

v.

Turner,

499 P.2d

839, 840-41

(Utah 1 9 7 2 ) .

Furthermore, the State's a s s e r t i o n s

that

the representation of counsel at the M a y 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing
served

no purpose

i s , at m o s t , speculative

at this point

of t h e

proceedings.
All

t h e more

troubling

in this

case

is t:l: le t:i :i a]

court's

complete failure, after requiring Defendant to appear p r o se at the
r erna indei: :)f the Sentencii ig Heai ii ig, t:c: obtai i i a > a ] id waiver of the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.

The significance

of t h e trial court's failure to obtain a w a i v e r in the instant case
is underscored

I'/ 1 le*

I'VIS^,

Kuehnert

i, Twiner,

1 9 7 2 ) , w h i c h the State cites in its B r i e f .

4"'^> P , 2d 839 (Utah

In Kuehnert,

the Utah

Supreme Court, in the process of remanding the case for resentencing
due t o t h e absence of counsel a n d w a i v e r of the right to c o u n s e l ,
noted

that

because

••- . . ; -

the record
a :i ^ n;e i

:f

d i d n o t indicate
tl le

rigl: it

"compelled" to hold the sentence "invalid."'

2.

knowingly and
•.---.

Id.

*....-

_'. . .

at 841.

THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT WAS
I N H E R E N T L Y UNFAIR BECAUSE T H E TRIAL C O U R T FAILED T O
CONSIDER LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS A N D FAILED T O
RESOLVE INACCURACIES IN T H E PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
R E P O R T IN T H E COURSE OF SENTENCING D E F E N D A N T .

The State argues in its Brief that "Defendant does not establish

I
that the court's m e m o r y of Parkview's program w a s e r r o n e o u s in a n y
i: e s p e c t

. . . ." (Brief M ] , \ppellee, p . 2 3 ) .
10

This is inaccurate

//as

because on pages 25-28 of Defendant's Brief, Defendant establishes
that the trial court failed to consider and clarify whether the
Parkview alternative treatment program met the qualifications for a
long term program pursuant to he recommendation of the Department of
Corrections

(see also

R.

65-67, Transcript

of July

25, 1995,

Sentencing Hearing).
Contrary to the State's assertion that the matter concerning the
discrepancies

in the

Presentence

Investigation

Report

was not

preserved below, trial counsel specifically brought the discrepancies
to the trial court's attention.

At that point in time, the trial

court had a responsibility pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a)
to resolve the discrepancies in the manner set forth in the statute,
which it failed to do.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the
Court vacate her sentence and remand the case for resentencing so
that Defendant might have the opportunity to be represented by
counsel during sentencing and so the trial court might consider all
legally relevant factors in the course of imposing sentence.
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument inasmuch as c > i al argi inient will
materially enhance the decisional process due
significant

issues

in

the

instant

appea

: the complex and
sealing

with

the

constitutional right to the right to the assistance of counsel, which
is a matter of continuing public interest, and which case involves
issues i r^quir \ n 4 l1|irther ^veloprnenit

n

^n 1 ii

- I nuinil

law.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition
of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For
Official

Publication"

for purposes of precedential value to aid

defense counsel In the areas of sentencing as a critical stage in the
•

1 i. n a I p r o c e e d i n g.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of May, 1996.
H6LMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

sEoit^L
Defendants for Defendant
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